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Adorno inspired much of Germany’s 1960s student movement, but he came increasingly into 
conflict with this movement about the practical implications of his critical theory. As early as 
1964, student activist lamented what they saw as an unbearable discrepancy between his 
analysis and his actions.
1
 As one of his PhD students later expressed it: 
[…] Adorno was incapable of transforming his private compassion towards the “damned of the 
earth” into an organized partisanship of theory engaged in the liberation of the oppressed. […] 
his critical option that any philosophy if it is to be true must be immanently oriented towards 
practical transformation of social reality, loses its binding force if it is not also capable of 
defining itself in organizational categories. […] Detachment […] drove Adorno […] into 
complicity with the ruling powers. […]. As he moved more and more away from historical 
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 For example, they produced leaflets with passages from Adorno’s own work – passages such as the following: 
“There can be no covenant with this world; we belong to it only to the extent that we rebel against it” – and 
invited students to contact Adorno to complain that he did not act accordingly (see Esther Leslie, ‘Introduction 
to Adorno/Marcuse Correspondence on the German Student Movement’, New Left Review I/233, January-
February 1999, pp. 118-123, here p. 119).  
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praxis, Adorno’s critical theory fell back into traditional forms of contemplation which could 
hardly be justified.
2
  
Similarly, a group of socialist students distributed leaflets in December 1968 that accused 
Adorno of being “critical in theory, conformist in practice.”
3
 Others joined the students in 
accusing Adorno of a quietism that is politically objectionable and in contradiction to his own 
theory – including, as we will see, his friend and colleague Marcuse.   
In this paper, I will reconstruct, and partially defend, Adorno’s views on theory and 
(political) praxis in Germany’s 1960s in eleven theses. The defence is partial because I do not 
think Adorno’s take on Vietnam and the international situation is convincing, and I also 
readily admit that he seriously misjudged the situation on that fateful 31.01.1969, when he 
called the police to clear students from the premises of the Institute of Social Research (see 
Thesis 9 below). Still, for the most part, I will suggest that there is no contradiction between 
Adorno’s theory and practice, but the latter followed naturally from the former, and that we 
can learn much from his stance. By way of preamble, consider this statement by Marx: 
What is to be done, and done immediately, at any given, particular moment in the future, 
depends, of course, wholly and entirely on the actual historical circumstances in which action 
is to be taken.
4
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This statement reminds us of a commonplace in politics and political philosophy, but it is one 
that that is perhaps not always sufficiently appreciated. I want to suggest that for Adorno it is 
absolutely pivotal: his often attacked and maligned stance during the 1960s is based on his 
analysis of these historical circumstances, according to which we have to navigate, in Cook’s 
words, “between the Scylla of quietistic withdrawal and the Charybdis of pathological forms 
of collection action.”
5
 As we see, Adorno situates himself concretely in response to how 
various tensions between theory and praxis play out historically.
6
  
 
1 
The transformation of the world failed. 
The above first thesis is perhaps most directly expressed at the beginning of Negative 
Dialectics:  
Philosophy, which once seemed outmoded, remains alive because the moment of its realization 
was missed. The summary judgement that it had merely interpreted the world is itself crippled 
by resignation before reality, and becomes a defeatism of reason after the transformation of the 
world failed.
7
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The first remarkable aspect of this passage is Adorno’s claim that the moment of the 
realisation of philosophy was missed.
8
 This suggests that Adorno thought there was a window 
of opportunity for a revolution – presumably, he is thinking here of the period from the 
Russian Revolution and the later stages of the First World War to fascism taking power in 
Italy, Germany, and Spain and the show trials in Moscow. During this period, class conflict 
was often openly fought, with a number of failed revolutionary attempts in Germany and 
elsewhere, while the Soviet Union was struggling to survive and establish a socialist society. 
The factors which explain the failure of the revolution in Germany and elsewhere are 
manifold – ranging from open repression to more subtle hindrances – and I cannot do justice 
to them here. The crucial point is that the missed opportunity had world-historical 
significance for Adorno. Indeed, it presents the foundational problem for (what was later 
known as) the Frankfurt School. Its members asked: Why and how was this opportunity 
missed? How could it happen that the proletariat – and humanity as a whole – remained in 
servitude? In particular, how could this be, despite the fact that, at least in the industrial West, 
the objective conditions for a social world without hunger and the need for domination had 
been in place?  
 One of the most damaging disappointments of these tragic times was the tyrannical 
nature of the Soviet Union. The Moscow show trials of 1936 are a turning point for Adorno 
and Horkheimer, and after these trials, they refused to support the regime or, even, place any 
hope in its future. These trials brought down the final curtain on freedom of expression and 
the possibility of critique, and revealed this supposedly socialist society as the bureaucratic 
dictatorship that it had become. Turning Marxist theory into dogma and suppressing (critical) 
thinking were – at least in Adorno’s view – important factors for why the transformation of 
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the world failed,
9
 both in the Soviet Union and later nominally socialist regimes. This 
necessitated renewed reflection – as Adorno says in the above quoted passage, “Philosophy, 
which once seemed outmoded, remains alive because the moment of its realization was 
missed.”
10
 If the transformation of the world has failed, then this does not leave unaffected 
the theory that said we should transform, not merely interpret, the world.
11
 Critical scrutiny of 
Marxist theory and its wider philosophical background is required,
12
 with some of its 
elements having been shown to be deficient (about which more later).
13
 Not least, what we 
need is an analysis of the Soviet Union and of how and why it embarked on the wrong path – 
a path that included the use of forced labour and torture,
14
 and the repressions of the more 
progressive socialist developments in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
15
  
 
                                                
9
 See Negative Dialectics, p. 143; and 20.1:391; see also Critical Models, p. 290. 
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 Negative Dialectics, p. 3; my emphasis. 
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13
 It is impossible to characterise what Adorno means by philosophy (or “theory”) in a way that is both accurate 
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distinct from or discontinuous with sociology, history, and other theoretical endeavours (in this way he remains 
indebted to Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary programme). His thesis that philosophy survives extends, thus, not 
only to what would be traditionally recognised as philosophy. Having said this, one important reason for why 
Adorno defends even philosophy traditionally understood – and not just theoretical endeavours further down the 
continuum of abstract reflection, such as historical, economic, or sociological analysis – is that ideas and 
theories shape the way we see and experience the world; and, in the absence of revolutionary transformation, 
combating distorted consciousness falls to theory (see also theses 4-5 below). 
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 Theodor W. Adorno, Can One Live after Auschwitz? – A Philosophical Reader, ed. by R. Tiedemann, trans. 
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2 
Praxis is postponed for the foreseeable future.16 
To understand this second thesis, we need to clarify first what Adorno means by “praxis 
[Praxis]”. Like many of the terms he uses, this term has multiple meanings in his writings 
and often more than one of them is at play. We might want to distinguish at least six 
meanings:
17
 
1. Praxis as activity/behaviour [Tätigkeit]. 
2. Praxis as productive labour. 
3. Praxis as revolutionary/transformative activity. 
4. Praxis as resistance [Widerstand] and not joining in [Nicht-Mitmachen].  
5. Praxis as actionism [Aktionismus].
18
 
6. Praxis as activity in a free society. 
When Adorn claims that praxis is postponed for the foreseeable future, then what he means is 
that revolutionary activity is postponed for the foreseeable future.
19
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 I’ll explain what Adorno means by this later; see thesis 10. 
19
 Adorno holds this thesis, despite the fact that he thinks that two of the conditions for revolutionary activity 
identified by Marx have been in place since the missed opportunity in the first half of the 20
th
 century: (1) the 
development of the forces of production has advanced to a point where humanity could live without hunger and 
domination while radically reducing labour time (see Can One Live after Auschwitz?, pp. 118, 121; 8:585; see 
also T.W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, ‘Towards a New Manifesto?’, New Left Review I/65, September-October 
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 What explains this pessimistic assessment of the historical conditions? One of the 
decisive factors – perhaps the decisive factor – is that, according to Adorno, the proletariat 
has been integrated into the capitalist social world in such a way as to blunt its revolutionary 
potential.
20
 As early as 1942, Adorno highlights this factor as key in understanding the failed 
opportunities of the 1920s and 30s,
21
 and it remains significant in the years after the World 
War II.
22
 There are at least three aspects at play here. Firstly, Adorno claims that Marx’ 
Immiseration Thesis – in a nutshell, the thesis that capitalism would tend to immiserate and 
impoverish more and more people, so that in the end they would have nothing to lose but 
their chains – turned out to be false, at least as far as the industrialised West is concerned.
23
 In 
other words, substantial parts of the working class had been materially integrated into 
capitalist society by way of higher living standards. Secondly, the proletariat has been 
integrated in terms of their consciousness
24
 – in fact, generally the social control of late 
modernity extends to people’s minds. Thus, while the class structure persists objectively, 
                                                                                                                                                  
2000, pp. 33-61, here pp. 54f); and (2) late modern society, especially in its openly capitalist guise, remains 
antagonistic as well as a class society (Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Society’, in S.E. Bronner & D.M. Kellner, eds., 
Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, New York/London: Routledge, 1989, pp. 267-75, here p. 272; and Can 
One Live after Auschwitz?, p. 114). Adorno maintains that a better world is, these conditions notwithstanding, 
objectively blocked (Critical Models, pp. 287f; see also 20.1:399) and that revolutionary attempts are bound to 
fail (as Adorno remarks when commenting on the events of May 1968 in Paris; see ‘Who’s afraid of the ivory 
tower? A conversation with Theodor W. Adorno’, edited, translated, and introduced by G. Richter, Monatshefte 
94.1, Spring 2002, pp. 10-23, p. 17). 
20
 Can One Live after Auschwitz?, pp. 96, 99f, 103, 107; and Critical Models, pp. 14, 72. 
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 Critical Models, 14, 72. 
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24
 ‘Society’, p. 272. 
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class consciousness is largely lacking and has been diminishing since the 1920s and early 
1930s.
25
 Specifically, Adorno repeatedly highlights the use of mass media and culture (the 
“culture industry”, as he calls it) as socially integrative forces – they distract people from 
their own real concerns, mould their desires and wishes (not least via advertisement), and 
provide ample room for the projection of their dreams and fears (see, most notably, the 
culture industry chapter in the Dialectic of Enlightenment).
26
 Thirdly, the tyrannical outcome 
of nominal socialism in the Soviet Union, later in its satellites, and then in China and Asia 
presents a key barrier for emancipation.
27
 In a postscript to a 1955 study of workers at a 
factory in Germany, Adorno writes that the fact that the workers operate completely within 
the capitalist system – even when they complain and criticise capitalism – is to a large extent 
explained by their rejection of the Soviet Union and disillusionment about socialist 
alternatives.
28
  
With the integration of the proletariat, the key element is missing from the Marxist 
view of a radical transformation: a social group that is (a) capable of gaining consciousness 
of the social world; (b) also capable of transforming this world as well as (c) required by its 
increasingly miserable condition to transform it (and in such a way, so as to free the whole of 
humanity, not just to replace one set of particular interests with another). These various 
elements now come apart. Those who can gain insight into the deeply problematic nature of 
late modern society might no longer be able to transform it and often rely on material and 
other privilege to gain the critical vantage point (they inhabit the “Grand Hotel Abyss”, in 
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Lukács’ memorable phrase).
29
 Those who could transform the social world are no longer best 
placed to understand it and are often too materially integrated to enter into radical opposition 
to this world, but instead pursue narrow interests within it (say when the German, highly 
skilled working class pursues their narrowly conceived interests against less skilled working 
classes in Germany and other countries). Finally, those who are most miserable might neither 
have the capacity to understand nor, crucially, to transform the social world. Accodring to 
Adorno, no other social subject that reunites the three aspects has replaced the proletariat or 
could do so in the foreseeable future.  
 A second decisive factor for why revolutionary practice is blocked is that such 
practice would presuppose free and possibly autonomous individuals, but – according to 
Adorno – they do not exist any longer.
30
 While Marx might have been wrong in claiming that 
capitalism will impoverish more and more people materially, the Immiseration Thesis has 
proved to be correct if understood differently: capitalism – despite appearances and 
ideological claims to the contrary – has diminished increasingly the freedom of its members, 
and the same holds true of the nominally socialist regimes that sprung up in opposition to it. 
Capitalism presents itself as offering an unprecedented expansion of choice, but this choice is 
mainly one among its “an immense accumulation of commodities.” Underneath this shallow 
appearance, genuine freedom and autonomy are, in fact, denied to all of us – either in ways 
we do not realise (because we internalised external pressures) or, if need be, by open 
repression.
31
 Ever since the end of the liberal phase of capitalism and the transition to the 
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 G. Lukács, The Theory of the Novel: A historico-philosophical essay on the forms of great epic literature, 
translated from the German by Anna Bostock, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971, p. 22. 
30
 See Critical Models, p. 270; see also ‘Society’, pp. 274f; and Can One Live after Auschwitz?, p. 120. 
31
 See Negative Dialectics, pp. 215f, 218f, 221, 232, 262, 273f, 297. 
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administered phase in the 1930s, the internal mechanisms of the modern social world no 
longer (re-)produce the kind of freedom that would be required for revolutionary activity.
32
 
 One further factor for Adorno is that no appropriate forms of revolutionary, but non-
repressive collective agency have yet developed.
33
 While I briefly return to this issue below, 
it is already noteworthy that he suggested that every organisation has an internal tendency to 
expand and to become divorced from the purposes for which it exists.
34
 Again, the nominally 
socialist regimes serve as cautionary tales in this regard.  
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 Similarly, Adorno thinks that identification and solidarity with the suffering of others is structurally eroded in 
modern societies – survival in both capitalism and nominal socialism requires people to be cold (see Negative 
Dialectics, p. 363; and Critical Models, pp. 201, 274; see also ‘Correspondence’, Adorno to Marcuse 
05/05/1969 and Marcuse’s reply 04/06/1969, pp. 127, 129). This also makes revolutionary activity more 
difficult.  
33
 One might think that the absence of a genuinely socialist party in Germany is a related obstacle. Attempts to 
ban the communist party (KPD) as unconstitutional had begun in 1951 and eventually succeeded in 1956; its 
successor party (DKP) was even more in line with Moscow’s dogmatism; and the social-democratic party (SPD) 
had definitely renounced its socialist heritage for good in 1959 at Bad Godesberg. Horkheimer repeatedly points 
to the absence of a genuinely socialist party as a problem in a set of private discussion with Adorno in 1956 
about writing a new communist manifesto (‘Towards a New Manifesto?’, pp. 44, 46, 47, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61). 
Still, Adorno seems less wedded to this: “When Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto there was no 
party either. It is not always necessary to join up with something already in existence” (‘Towards a New 
Manifesto?’, p. 60). Later in the same conversation, he adds: “Any appeal to form a left-wing socialist party is 
not on the agenda. Such a party would either be dragged along in the wake of the Communist Party, or it would 
suffer the fate of the SPD or Labour Party. It is not a political issue that there is no party” (‘Towards a New 
Manifesto?’, p. 61).  
34
 8:442; see also ‘Society’, pp. 273f. 
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3 
 There is no right life in the wrong [life], not even in politics. 
The famous claim that wrong life cannot be lived rightly is originally the conclusion of 
Adorno’s reflections about the damaged individual’s life within the private sphere (and 
emblematically for it, the home).
35
 Yet, it is warranted to extend this thesis to the political 
sphere too. Indeed, what is characteristic for Adorno about the impossibility of right living in 
the private sphere, is characteristic also for the public and political sphere: the modern social 
world engenders an antinomical structure of our option space, such that whatever we do, we 
cannot but act and live wrongly.
36
 In the private sphere we, among other things, should not 
make ourselves at home in the world, but cannot but do so in order to survive at all. Similarly, 
in the political sphere, the various options open to us individually and collectively are also 
problematic. We have already seen that Adorno thinks that revolutionary practice is blocked 
(see thesis 2), but this is not the only form of political and public activity that is wrong for 
him.  
The closest Adorno comes to recommending a form of living is to endorse a defensive 
stance of resistance against the bad forms of life that late modernity, on his view, structurally 
cannot but produce. This form of not joining in may range from refusing to go to the cinema 
to criticising sexual morality and laws based on it to – as we will see later – fighting fascist 
regimes. Still, at the same time, Adorno always insists on the fact that even resistance and not 
joining in are not without their faults – even in pursuing them, we do not and cannot achieve 
right living. For a start, he is keenly aware that resistance against repression can itself easily 
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 T.W. Adorno, Minima Moralia, translation by E.F.N. Jephcott, London: Verso, 1978, aphorism no. 18. 
36
 See Critical Models, pp. 4, 84; and 20.1:399. 
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become repressive,
37
 presumably despite the best intentions of the actors involved and for 
structural reasons. One might think here of how the nascent Soviet regime became internally 
repressive partly as a consequence of civil war and external pressure. To take another 
example, resistant movements against German occupation during World War II probably had 
to be organised in such a way as to involve blind command structures and severe punishment 
of suspected collaborators or traitors without the usual safeguards of due process. All things 
considered, these steps might have been necessary and unavoidable, but Adorno’s point is 
that we would be mistaken to think that this means that nothing has gone wrong here – he 
denies that what is practically necessary always coincides with right living. Even in less 
extreme settings, there might be a tendency to suppress reflections and doubts among the 
ranks of a party or protest movements or to accept “collateral damage” in order to achieve 
maximum effect without delay. Indeed, even where resistance does not involve repression by 
those engaged in it, there is the further danger of its provoking repression,
38
 and this might in 
turn lead to the resistance’s becoming more violent and repressive, resulting in an escalation 
of violence and a net increase of repression. An illustration of this is the German student 
movement of the 1960s, the state’s reaction to it, the left-wing terrorist cells that emerged in 
the 1970s in response to that, and, in turn, the state’s reaction to them. For example, the 
terrorist group “Movement 2 June [Bewegung 2. Juni]” was named after the day at which a 
peaceful demonstrator – Benno Ohnesorg – was shot dead by a German policemen in Berlin. 
It responded, in part, to the fact that the policemen in question was cleared of having 
committed any offence by the courts, which sparked mass protest and led to disillusionment 
with the German state. The action of groups such as Movement 2 June then led to restrictions 
of liberties and other forms of state repression. Invoking this example is not to say that 
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 Critical Models, p. 290; and 11:504. 
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 See, for example, ‘Correspondence’, Adorno to Marcuse 19/06/1969, p. 131. 
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Ohnesorg should have not gone demonstrating in the first place, but merely to note that such 
acts of peaceful non-conformity do not guarantee right living, partly because they can have – 
however unintended – negative consequences that detract from any unqualifiedly positive 
appraisal of them. 
Even when we move along the spectrum to more ordinary politics, to reformist 
attempts of ameliorating current conditions, Adorno suggests that we will fall short of right 
living. He thinks that the late modern social world would require fundamental change – for 
broadly Marxist reasons: this world is so structured that it cannot but produce misery, 
alienation, and even tendencies towards totalitarian domination, with Auschwitz not an 
accident, but an example of “[…] the indifference of the life of every individual, which 
history is moving towards: already in their formal freedom they are as fungible and 
replaceable as under the boots of the liquidators.”
39
 However, the required transformation 
cannot be achieved by way of piecemeal reforms.
40
 Such reforms might have a role to play in 
preventing the worst (more on this below under thesis 8); but reforms will always be limited 
and ultimately not threaten the current social world. Moreover, constructive and positive 
engagement with the social world – in short, making suggestions for improvements – is also 
problematic for another reason: if not repressed, then such contributions make one an 
accomplice of a social world that deserves to be changed, not made more inhabitable;
41
 it 
suggests that we could administer this world for the better, when, in fact, it is 
unadministrable.
42
  
                                                
39
 Negative Dialectics, p. 362; Redmond’s translation used. 
40
 See 8:579f; see also Critical Models, p. 268. 
41
 Critical Models, p. 4. 
42
 ‘Society’, p. 275. 
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Right living is also not found beyond the public or political sphere. Adorno repeatedly 
criticises the idea of an ethics focused exclusively on individual conduct.
43
 Such an ethics 
overlooks that right living requires a political transformation of our social world – “[…] the 
quest for right living is the quest for the right form of politics.”
44
 Moreover, Adorno objects 
to withdrawing from society and not intervening in it at all – for, even when this is done out 
of protest or disgust, it just leaves in place or even inadvertedly strengthens a status quo 
which deserves to be changed.
45
 In fact, he even criticises withdrawing into pure 
contemplation, rejecting it as resignation,
46
 despite his otherwise positive comments on 
contemplation.
47
 Surprisingly perhaps, he even admits that a focus on the aesthetic realm – 
something of which he himself it is often said to have been guilty – is an expression of false 
consciousness.
48
 Perhaps more surprisingly still, Adorno also concedes that even theory is 
affected by the illness of our social world.
49
 In particular, the failure of the revolutionary 
practice and especially the integration of the proletariat mean that theory no longer has a 
social referent of the sort that Marx and Marxism envisages: a subject that is both capable to 
change the social world and forced by its own dire situation to do so. Critical theorists can no 
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 Critical Models, pp. 263f; and T.W. Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, trans. by R. Livingstone, 
Cambridge: Polity, 2000, 176. 
44
 Problems of Moral Philosophy, p. 176; translation amended. 
45
 Critical Models, p. 4; and Negative Dialectics, 6:241/243. 
46
 20.1:288. Elsewhere Adorno concedes that there is “[…] the element of subjective weakness that clings to the 
narrowed focus on theory” (Critical Models, p. 289). This seems also what Adorno has in mind in a cryptic 
remark in 1966 “that he feels an increasing aversion to praxis, in contradiction to his own theoretical position” 
(20.2:738; see also 20.1:399; Letter to Grass 04/11/1968, Tiedemann, Frankfurter Adorno Blätter VI, p. 81). 
47
 See, for example, ‘Towards a New Manifesto?’, p. 50; and Negative Dialectics, p. 244. 
48
 See R. Tiedemann, ed., Frankfurter Adorno Blätter VIII, München: edition text und kritik, 2003, p. 18. 
49
 See, for example, Negative Dialectics, p. 245.  
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longer think of themselves as the avant-garde of a revolutionary class; they completely lack a 
connection to social or economic power.
50
 Where Marx could still talk of philosophy as the 
head and the proletariat as the heart of the movement,
51
 only the head remains and this – 
Adorno concedes – leaves matters in a worse state: to stay with the metaphor, the head is 
drained of its life-blood.  
In sum, for Adorno, whatever one does in this social world, one does it wrongly – be 
it political activity or private decency, be it praxis or theory. Good intentions and readiness to 
act on them do not suffice to change this;
52
 as the saying goes, the road to hell is paved by 
good intentions, and the experience of nominal socialism would provide ample examples here. 
This leads us to the fourth thesis, for as Adorno writes:  
Those, however, who can do nothing that does not threaten to turn out for the worse even if 
meant for the best, are constrained to thinking; that is their justification and that of the 
happiness of spirit.
53
 
 
4  
Theory has priority in the current conditions. 
While this fourth thesis might seem to contradict what I just said in respect to the third thesis, 
this is only so, if we ignore one important aspect of Adorno’s claim that there can be no right 
living in our social world: this claim is compatible with saying that some forms of living are 
                                                
50
 Negative Dialectics, p. 144; and Critical Models, p. 15; see also Minima Moralia, aphorisms no. 34, 86. 
51
 ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction’ [1844], MEW, I:391/MECW 
III:187. 
52
 See Negative Dialectics, pp. 143f; Critical Models, pp. 4, 264, 265. 
53
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worse than others, and that engaging in critical theory (along with a certain defensive 
political praxis – something I will come back later in thesis 8) is the least bad form of living. 
There are three main, interrelated reasons for this: firstly, the failure of revolutionary practice 
requires us to reflect critically on the revolutionary theory (as mentioned earlier, if the 
transformation of the world failed, its interpretation also requires rethinking); secondly, 
thought has – at least in the current context – more resources to avoid negative, unintended 
repercussions than praxis (revolutionary or otherwise); and, finally, one of the main obstacles 
to revolutionary practice and one of the main factors towards renewed barbarism is the 
integration, even poisoning of consciousness, against which theorising can offer some 
immunisation strategies. Let me expand on each of these three reasons in turn. 
 In a dialectical inversion not untypical of Adorno’s thinking, he writes: 
The desperate state of affairs, that the praxis on which everything depends is thwarted, 
paradoxically affords thinking the breathing-space which it would practically be criminal not to 
use.
54
 
One of the key reasons why Adorno thinks that praxis demands that theory takes precedence 
now is that the failed transformation of the world revealed problems in revolutionary theory – 
some of which I mentioned already above. Specifically, one of the important elements that 
have been missing for revolutionary praxis to become possible again is a renewed analysis of 
the situation and its constraints.
55
 Prior to having this analysis, revolutionary praxis or 
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attempts to resurrect it are doomed. One important aspect here is the issue of finding forms of 
organisation and, more generally, praxis that are not repressive. Crucial for this is to analyse 
those well-intentioned forms of praxis that backfired, sometimes terribly – such as the 
nominally socialist regimes.  
 Adorno sometimes overstates his case in ways that conflicts with some of his other 
key insights:
56
 
The Archimedian point – how a nonrepressive praxis might be possible, how one might steer 
between the alternatives of spontaneity and organization – this point, if it exists at all, cannot 
be found other than through theory.
57
 
                                                                                                                                                  
given possibility failed to be realized, Marx spent decades in the British Museum writing a theoretical work on 
national economy. That he did so without having engaged in much praxis in reality is not a matter of mere 
biographical accident; an historical moment is imprinted in this” (Introduction to Sociology, trans. by. E. 
Jephcott, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 150). 
56
 One might also complain – as Wiggershaus has – that Adorno does not actually provide the revised and 
updated theory of society required for an analysis of the situation and its constraints (R. Wiggershaus, The 
Frankfurt School: its history, theories and political significance, trans. by M. Robertson, Cambridge: Polity, 
1994, p. 600). Also, his critical reflections on nominal socialism are rather limited. It seems to me that the first 
part of this complaint is overstated – while Adorno might not have provided the sort of complete theory that 
Marx aspired to (albeit, arguably, also failed to deliver), he does provide reasons for why capturing the social 
whole in one theoretical construction is not, or at least no longer, possible. He also engaged in various 
sociological critiques of the current social world. The second part of the complaint seems more warranted – 
perhaps Adorno thought that others, like Marcuse (in his Soviet Marxism: a critical analysis, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1958), had already provided the critical analysis of nominal socialism or that he was 
not best equipped to undertake this task. Also, perhaps he focused on, so to speak, the devil he knew – 
especially given how little reliable sociological data from the Soviet block there was and that he would have 
been unable to undertake or commission independent studies there. Still, it strikes me as a lacuna in his work.  
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This claim is in tension with Adorno’s otherwise Hegelian thinking that theorising cannot 
anticipate practical solutions, but – like the owl of the Minerva flying at dusk – can only 
reflect upon them and bring them to consciousness. Indeed, Adorno often rejects the view 
that theory, that philosophy, could provide immediate, concrete instructions or directives for 
praxis.
58
 Similarly, he rejects that praxis is mere implementation of theory.
59
 Indeed, 
according to Adorno, it is not accidental that Marx’s theory lacks an account of the concrete 
steps of transformation – the emancipation of the proletariat could only be its own doing, 
with an emphasis on doing.
60
 However, Adorno does not, in fact, require making the very 
strong claim of the just quoted passage – a weaker claim would do, namely, the claim that the 
first step towards a non-repressive praxis is to analyse how praxis can and has become 
repressive, despite the best intentions of the actors. Admittedly, it would leave room for some 
forms of practical attempts at finding non-repressive praxis, but this should be welcome, even 
from Adorno’s own perspective.
61
  
 The second reason why engaging in theory has currently priority is the following. 
Adorno claims that theorising has more resources that prevents it from sliding into repression 
or inadvertent support of the status quo. For a start, theory can reflect on itself, whereas 
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praxis requires theory for this task.
62
 Insofar as revolutionary activity is blocked and 
reflection on both revolutionary praxis and theory is both required and the only thing radical 
we can genuinely undertake in the historical situation, theory has priority within this situation. 
Also, theory’s reflectiveness means that it is further away from repression than immediate 
action, which has an affinity with blind violence, with “striking out [Zuschlagen].”
63
 
Moreover, while theory is also implicated in what is wrong with our social world in various 
ways, it also points beyond it. According to Adorno, thinking is essentially characterised by 
not accepting things passively or at face value.
64
 While critical thinking can be suppressed as 
much as critical praxis can, the validity of what is thought outlives those who thought it and 
in this sense its critical potential cannot be completely eradicated: 
Whatever has once been thought can be suppressed, forgotten, can vanish. But it cannot be 
denied that something of it survives. For thinking has the element of universality. What once 
was thought cogently must be thought elsewhere, by others: this confidence accompanies even 
the most solitary and powerless thought.
65
 
This might strike us as unrealistically optimistic, especially if Adorno’s otherwise bleak 
analysis of our social world and human history is true. Moreover, it is not clear that one could 
not make a similar claim about praxis – cogently carried out practice will be (re-)discovered 
once again, at least if the problems to which it was the solutions are encountered again. Still, 
Adorno’s thought might be that cogently carried out revolutionary practice in response to the 
late modern social world has not yet seen the light of the day, but cogently thought out 
critical theory of this world has. This might explain why Adorno places his trust first and 
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foremost in theorising. In any case, the initial consideration continues to hold: critical 
reflection on what went wrong is the order of the day, and, thus, it is to theory, not to praxis, 
that we have to turn. 
There is another aspect here: while the individual theorist lacks power because he or 
she is at the margins of society (and no longer the avant-garde of a major social class), this 
very marginal existence also means that theorists are exempted or excluded from practices of 
the kind which integrates the majority of people into the social world – be it via the 
disciplinary effects of the workplace or other integrative social pressures inherent in many 
practices.
66
 There is dialectic irony here: by lacking real force and being good for nothing in 
the current world, philosophy has critical potential.
67
 
 A third reason for theory’s priority is that an analysis of and an enlightenment about 
distortions in our consciousness is necessary both, in the first instance, as a defensive act 
against irrational and fascist tendencies objectively present in our social world, and, secondly, 
for revolutionary practice. In a nutshell, Adorno thinks that one of the main reasons why 
Auschwitz happened and why a capitalist society in the West and a repressive bureaucratic 
regime in the East can sustain themselves, despite both disregarding the real interests of the 
individuals living in them, is a distortion of consciousness and an increasing reduction of 
genuine experiences that could reveal this distortion. Of utmost practical importance is thus 
to change our consciousness and enhance our ability to have as unrestricted experiences as 
possible. Yet, in line with the dialectical inversion mentioned above, this practical necessity 
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is a task for theory. This is so because our consciousness and abilities to experience are partly 
distorted by the way we conceptualised the world – and the critique of this conceptualisation 
can, at least in our historical situation (where transformative practice is blocked), only be the 
work of theory. It is here where Negative Dialectics, Adorno’s magnum opus, and also his 
posthumously published Aesthetic Theory have their place: as philosophical critiques of ways 
of conceptualising and experiencing the world. Generally, one of the main aims – perhaps the 
main aim – of Adorno’s theorising was to contribute to immunising people against those 
factors and tendencies that distort consciousness and restrict experience (not least because 
such distortions and restrictions can contribute to the re-emergence of fascism, which remains 
a latent possibility in our social world).
68
 Adorno’s contribution mainly consisted in 
criticising distorted thought forms.
69
 Still, his theorising also has a more directly practical 
implication: namely, educating the educators.
70
 Adorno’s public engagement throughout the 
1950s and ‘60s in radio and television involved a number of talks on education and how it 
can and should instil critical thought in pupils and students.
71
 Similarly, he was very active in 
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teaching and examining future teachers and writing about their profession.
72
 A striking aspect 
of this work is that Adorno rejected any forms of propaganda or other forms of manipulative 
persuasion,
73
 at least in democratic settings.
74
 To become a subject requires for Adorno that 
one is treated as one, or at least as if one were one. In this way, theory’s role in practice is not 
to provide concrete directives, but to enable a change in the consciousness of the actors – it is, 
thus, a largely indirect role. Crucially, though, theory changes by remaining theory; it 
intervenes qua theory.
75
  
 In these ways, theory for Adorno has priority – or as he puts it more emphatically at 
one point, “Despite all its unfreedom, theory is the guarantor [Statthalter] of freedom in the 
midst of unfreedom.”
76
 Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind both the historical index 
of this claim – theory’s priority is restricted to the current, non-revolutionary situation – and 
the fact that there is something decidedly sub-optimal, second best, about this situation – for 
given the deeply problematic nature of our modern social world (and its thought forms), it 
would be far preferable if we were in a context where (revolutionary) praxis could have 
priority over interpreting the world. It is just that we are not in such a context, however we 
much we (have reasons to) regret this. Adorno’s point is not that it is always best to 
concentrate one’s efforts on theorising, but that doing so (along with undertaking certain 
defensive acts to which we come below) is the least bad form of living in what is a very bad 
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context. Moreover, the situation may change – given the antagonistic nature of the modern 
social world, “[…] situations may arise today or tomorrow which, while they are very likely 
to be catastrophic, at the same time restore the possibility of practical action which is today 
obstructed.”
77
 However, such a change cannot be forced into existence (neither by theory nor 
direct political activism), and until it occurs, theorising retains its priority.  
 
5  
Theory is a form of practice. 
Adorno would not be the thinker he is, if he simply accepted the dichotomy between theory 
and praxis. While for him there is, indeed, a distinction between practical and theoretical 
activity, this distinction should not be absolutised or overstrechted. For one thing, both are 
forms of activity (the first sense under thesis 2 above). At least in this minimal sense, theory 
is just as much praxis as revolutionary activity.
78
 However, this is not the only sense in which 
the distinction breaks down: theory, according to Adorno, is also praxis in at least two other 
senses – theory is praxis-as-resistance;
79
 and it is even a constitutive part of practice-as-
revolutionary-activity.
80
 As far as the first is concerned, what I said under thesis 4 reapplies 
here: thinking is resistance in both (a) not accepting state of affairs for what they are or 
appear to be;
81
 and (b) its capacity to immunise us from the distorting influences on 
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consciousness. Indeed, to see through the hostility to theorising – that is, to realise how this 
hostility is encouraged by the social world and serves to maintain it – is itself a form of 
praxis-as-resistance.
82
 Its very existence is already an act of defiance against the repression of 
independent thought that is essential for the smooth working of status quo. Similarly, theory 
is a (necessary but not sufficient) part of practice-as-revolutionary-activity insofar as 
revolutionary activity builds on the analysis of the current situations, and, in fact, is animated 
by this analysis. Indeed, if praxis is not so animated (as it was insufficiently in the nominally 
socialist regimes), it fails and becomes wrong – and as such, it is, in fact, no longer praxis at 
all:   
Praxis without theory, lagging behind the most advanced state of cognition, cannot but fail, and 
praxis, in keeping with its own concept, would like to succeed. False praxis is no praxis.
83
 
In sum, contrary to what Adorno’s critics on the New Left believed, theory is not something 
other than praxis, but rather is in, at least three senses, itself a form of praxis. If anything, 
theory is often too practical for those hostile to it, albeit here in a further sense still: it 
requires laborious and patient work;
84
 in contrast to the immediate gratification that actionism 
promises (see thesis 10 below). 
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6  
Theory should not be beholden to political activity. 
Adorno thinks that theory should maintain a certain independence especially vis-à-vis direct 
political action and tactic.
85
 The reasons for this are manifold. 
 Firstly, Adorno argues that division of labour produces here, as in many other areas of 
life, better results than merging two activities and having them carried out together by the 
same actors. At one point, he offers an interesting analogy: the rigorous pursuit of physics has 
yielded many useful results for practical activities in other human spheres, and, specifically, 
nuclear physics might have enabled the development of a new form of energy-generation, but 
this happened as a by-product of autonomous theorising, not as a consequence of aiming for a 
new energy source or of having been commissioned to find one.
86
  
 Secondly, Adorno also criticises the demand that theory should be practically 
applicable, utilisable, or exploitable by pointing out that what is practically applicable, 
utilisable, or exploitable is determined by the wrong social world that we should change.
87
 It 
is the nature of this world that it allows only reforms and activities which stay within it, so 
that whenever we limit theory by what is practically possible, we make radical social critique 
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impossible. Thus, rather than enabling revolutionary practice, such a demand would be to 
abandon it. Moreover, this demand is also infected by the constant pressure to contribute to 
social production characteristic of both capitalist and nominally socialist regimes
88
 – by the 
productivist ethos to utilise every minute to the full and to keep all wheels constantly turning. 
Rather than accepting and partaking in these pressures, we should criticise them and refuse to 
join in, where we can.
89
  
 Thirdly, and picking up a theme from earlier (see thesis 4), it would be too much to 
ask of theory to require that it provides a blueprint for a better world:
90
 at least when it comes 
to ethical and political activities, theory is a reflective, not so much a predictive medium. 
Theory cannot solve problems in this area of life, but has to rely first on the development of 
practical solutions which it can then help refining. Theorising, even imagining, is bound by 
the materials of the status quo and, if at all, it can yield only something radically different 
from it at a too abstract level to be directly applicable in practice.  
 All of this is not to say that critical theory has no practical telos – according to 
Adorno, every thought has such a telos.
91
 However, this practical orientation is merely 
indirectly prescribed in theoretical activity – otherwise, it sabotages thinking and thereby 
itself. To return to an earlier analogy: nuclear physics has a connection to possible praxis, not 
because it stands under the imperative of yielding practical implementations, but because it 
involves an exercise of reason, which by its nature has a connection to the practical teloi of 
humanity; similarly, critical theory should not be subjected to the demands of practical 
applicability (as measured and shaped by the current social world), but retains nonetheless a 
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connection to the possible practice of a freed humanity, which is its orientating interest. In 
this way, “The theory that is not conceived as an instruction for its realization should have the 
most hope of realization; […];”
92
 and philosophy “[…] effects change precisely by remaining 
theory.”
93
 
 
7  
Democracy has only shallow roots in post‐war [West] Germany. 
This thesis is based, in part, on sociological work of the Institute, particularly in the 1950s but 
also the 1960s.
94
 This mostly qualitative research revealed that there remained significant 
scepticism about democracy among the West German population. While democracy was 
formally adhered to under the watchful eyes of the Western allies, it had not become part of 
people’s convictions and activities in the way it had in the USA.
95
 Instead of a healthy public 
sphere, there was a mentality of subordination to authority as well as distrust of intellectuals 
and public criticisms of the state.
96
 An active citizenship was largely lacking. For the most 
part, people quietly accepted Adenauer’s politics of restoration, despite the fact that its 
democratic credentials credentials were questionable – notably when it came to (a) permitting 
previous NS officials back into positions of power; (b) outlawing the communist party; and (c) 
barring from any positions in the civil service all members from the (mainly communist) 
                                                
92
 Critical Models, p. 277. 
93
 ‘Who’s afraid of the ivory tower?’, p. 19; see also Critical Models, p. 264; 15:159. 
94
 R. Schmidt & E. Becker, Reaktionen auf politische Vorgänge: Drei Meinungsstudien, Frankfurt a.M.: 
Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1967. 
95
 See Critical Models, pp. 239f; see also Tiedemann, Frankfurter Adorno Blätter VI, pp. 171f. 
96
 Critical Models, pp. 284, 287. 
28 
 
Society of People Persecuted by the Nazi Regime – Federation of Anti-Fascists (Vereinigung 
der Verfolgten des Naziregimes – Bund der Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten) (VVN-
BdA). The fragile state of West German democracy and rule of law also emerged vividly 
during the so-called Spiegel-Affäre (1962), in which the editor of a German weekly magazine 
(Der Spiegel) was illegally deprived of his liberty and imprisoned for months after this 
magazine had revealed NATO’s rather negative assessment of the West German armed forces. 
Starting in 1966, a right-extreme, racist party, the NPD, had entered parliaments in several 
states of the West German federal republic, and threatened to pass the 5% hurdle at the 
national level too.
97
 Adorno was particularly worried by the state of emergency legislation 
[Notstandgesetze] accepted by the German Bundestag in 1968 and spoke out publicly against 
it – referring back to how similar clauses in the Weimar Republic’s constitution had led to an 
erosion of democracy in the early 1930s and ultimately to Hitler’s gaining power.
98
 There 
were also actual signs of violent repression: as already mentioned, a student named Benno 
Ohnesorg had been shot at a demonstration in Berlin in 1967, but the police officer who shot 
him was let off scot-free. Adorno denied that West Germany was a fascist state during the 
1960s. Still, he feared that it might develop into one.
99
 Indeed, even in the USA, where 
democracy had reached into everyday life, a “veering towards totalitarian forms of 
domination” was a latent possibility in Adorno’s eyes, if only because he thought that “[s]uch 
a danger is an inherent tendency of modern society.”
100
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 In sum, Adorno saw Western Germany as a fragile democracy which needed 
nurturing, not least because the existing and past alternatives to it were so much worse, 
including the nominally socialist regimes to the East – which brings us to the next thesis.  
 
8  
Political activity in the West should be critical but broadly defensive. 
While the liberal-capitalist West deserves radical change – a change that is, however, blocked 
for the foreseeable future (see thesis 2) – its socio-political system provided the least bad 
alternative available in the 1960s. In this context, its positive gains – such as freedom of 
expression, rule of law, material wealth, and public health systems – should be defended. 
Such defence might even include trying to extend the range of areas of life that benefit from 
these gains (for example, campaigning to secure for same sex couples the legal rights that so 
far only heterosexual couples enjoyed). The defensive stance is directly related to the 
previous thesis about the fragility of democracy in West Germany and, ultimately, in every 
country. Democracies need active participation of citizens in public life
101
 – with Adorno’s 
radio and TV appearances as a good example of what he might have had in mind. 
Interestingly, the defence of the liberal-capitalist West might be best served critical 
engagement with it.
102
 Presumably, this is partly because a lively public sphere of 
accountability is more likely to preserve the gains in question than glorifying adoration or an 
unqualified defence. However, in rare cases, more emphatic support might be required – or at 
least, even stronger criticism of the alternatives.
103
. Adorno goes as far as to suggest that 
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under the current circumstances even paltry reforms have more legitimacy than they would 
otherwise have.
104
 
It is important to emphasise that Adorno’s defence of Western liberal democracies 
rests on instrumental and historical grounds – on avoiding the worst in a given situation. It is 
not an endorsement of these regimes as such. To rephrase Churchill: liberal democracy is the 
worst form of government, except for all the others available in the 1960s. 
 This view puts Adorno at loggerheads with his friend and fellow-member of the 
Frankfurt School, Marcuse, who – partly because of the war in Vietnam – thought that it was 
far from certain that the West-dominated status quo was better than anything else that could 
take its place, despite also doubting that there was a revolutionary situation.
105
 Marcuse 
candidly asks whether this status quo really is the lesser evil for the majority of people, when 
one considers the plight of those who live in Vietnam or in the ghettos of South America.
106
 
This disagreement is intimately linked with to the next thesis. 
 
9 
 Political violence should be restricted to resistance in fascist contexts. 
While Adorno did not exclude the use of (political) violence categorically for all 
circumstances, he was adamant that it had no place within democratic societies.
107
 One of the 
main considerations seemed to have been that violence tends to breed further violence, 
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leading to an ever expanding cycle of violence, not its end.
108
 In this way violent protest 
might make things much worse, inadvertedly fostering more repression than would otherwise 
have been used in democracies. Only against a fascist regime are violent means of resistance 
legitimate – for example, Adorno accepted that it would be permissible to use violence for 
this purpose against the Greek military junta.
109
 Presumably, such a regime is so morally 
reprehensible that the danger of a violent backslash is not decisive anymore as a 
consideration. While ends are not indifferent to means,
110
 in certain emergency situations 
almost all means are legitimate – just that 1960s West Germany was no such emergency 
situation.
111
  
Adorno here was in disagreement with the student protest movement, or at least the 
most radical wing of it. In fact, as early as April 1968, activists, who later formed the core of 
the Red Army Faction [Rote Armee Fraktion], committed arson attacks against two retailers 
in Frankfurt in protest against the war in Vietnam and the complacency about this war among 
the German public. Beyond his moral objections, Adorno also thought it foolish to import 
guerrilla tactics into the Western democracies, remarking in 1969 that “[m]odels that do not 
prove themselves even in the Bolivian bush cannot be exported.”
112
 But even those who did 
not want to realise Adorno’s theory with Molotov-cocktails, but only with sit-ins and 
occupations, came into opposition to him.
113
 He accepted that sit-ins may be a legitimate 
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form of protest in some contexts. For example, Adorno thought that the smearing campaign 
by right-wing newspapers and magazines against the left had already indirectly contributed to 
an assassination attempt on a leader of the student movement, Rudi Dutschke; and he 
considered sit-ins to prevent or disrupt the distribution of these publications among the 
permissible means to respond to this.
114
 However, he remained concerned about any breaches 
of rules and any forms of criminal activity, even if done for progressive aims.
115
  
Most famously perhaps is the episode that took place on 31.01.1969: Adorno (along 
with the co-directors of the Institute of Social Research) called the police to clear 70 students 
from the premises of the Institute whom he/(they) perceived to be in the process of occupying 
it. (It is, actually, unclear whether the students wanted to occupy the building – they always 
maintained that they were just wanting to use the rooms for a meeting to discuss their future 
actions, having been thwarted in (re)occupying the sociology department. Still, they refused 
to leave despite being repeatedly asked to do so by Adorno and his co-directors.) This 
episode and the subsequent trial of the perceived leader of this group – Adorno’s own PhD 
student Krahl – accelerated the already simmering fall-out with the students, who 
subsequently twice disrupted Adorno’s lectures, leading him to abandon the lecture series. At 
the end of the semester, he left distraught for a mountain vacation, during which he 
succumbed to a heart attack at the age of 65.  
This fall-out with the students was also at issue in Adorno’s disagreement with 
Marcuse in 1969, who bluntly noted that “if the alternative is the police or left-wing students, 
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then I am with the students.”
116
 Beyond Adorno’s negative attitude to many forms of protests 
in the West, another matter of contention was his view that whoever deplores the violence 
and repression of the South Vietnamese and US forces also has to deplore the means 
employed by the Vietcong (notably its use of torture) – seemingly equated the two in moral 
terms.
117
 Against this, Marcuse insisted on a clear moral distinction between violence used in 
fighting aggression and that employed by the aggressor and in repression.
118
 Although 
Adorno might have accepted the validity of this distinction for some contexts – most 
obviously for the context of fighting fascist regimes – he clearly rejected it for the context of 
the democratic West and also seemed to think that the torture employed by the Vietcong was 
indefensible, even if used as part of a liberation movement.  
Undoubtedly, some of Adorno’s calls in this late 1960s context were mistaken – most 
obviously his decision to call the police to clear out the Institute, when there was no real 
danger to persons and it was not even clear that an occupation was taking place. Marcuse is 
also right that Adorno largely neglected the plight of people at the peripheries; how this 
plight was, at least in part, the implications of the West’s maintaining its high living standard; 
and how the countries of the West were (formally) democratic at home, but far from 
respectful of democracy and individual rights abroad. Still, Adorno’s rejection of using of 
violence in democratic settings has much to be recommended, not least because history 
contains many a tale of how violence can spiral out of control (something about which he 
repeatedly warned). The conservative critics of the 1970s who accused him, and the Frankfurt 
School generally, of paving the way for left-wing terrorism were clearly mistaken: whatever 
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influence his writings might have had on Ulrike Meinhoff and the other members of the Red 
Armee Faction, they blatantly disregarded the letter and the spirit of his work in what they 
did. In the post-war West German context, Adorno’s work licensed only the weapons of 
criticism, not criticism by weapons. 
 
10 
Assigning primacy to political activity, actionism [Aktionismus], is the true 
resignation in the face of our social world. 
By eschewing much political activity and insisting on doing theory instead, Adorno was 
accused by the student movement, and others outside it, of resignation. Many of those 
inspired by his critical theory felt betrayed by what they perceived as a failure to draw the 
practical consequences from this very theory. Adorno, however, retorted that it is the opposite 
position – the one he entitles “actionism [Aktionismus]” – that is in truth expressive of 
resignation and, more even, that it is regressive and bordering on authoritarianism. Actionism 
is less idiomatic in English than in German, and so it might be worth spelling out what 
Adorno has in mind here. The German Duden notes two meanings: (a) striving to change 
people’s consciousness or the existing state of affairs in society, art or literature by engaging 
in targeted provocative or revolutionary actions; and (b) exaggerated urge to engage in 
activities (often derogatory). This ambiguity is very fitting: while the first meaning is what 
the student protest aimed for, the second is what Adorno accused them of. Many of the 
reasons for this we have already encountered: the fact that the current situation calls for 
renewed reflection and analysis, not action; the dangers that even practice that aims at 
resistance and progressive change might provoke a net increase in repression; the lack of non-
repressive forms of collective agency; and the absence of a revolutionary subject and 
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situation. The following four considerations add to and partly draw on the picture presented 
so far. 
Firstly, Adorno suspects that actionism is actually a vain attempt to compensate for 
both (a) the fact that revolutionary activity is blocked and (b) the disintegration and paranoia 
of individuals by engaging in largely blind activities for their own sake.
119
 Presumably, what 
he means here is not that this is the result of a conscious decision, but rather that the self-
styled acts of resistance and provocation are, in fact, mere compensatory measures of keeping 
busy – indeed, he once likens them to captured animals that frantically pace up and down in 
their cages.
120
 In this way, the activities are more like pseudo-activities, such that the tragedy 
of the failed transformation of the world in the early 20
th
 century is now repeated as the farce 
of pseudo-revolutions.
121
 
Secondly, actionism is driven by the pleasure principle,
122
 even by narcissism.
123
 This 
explains why it is attractive to its participants and also why critique of it is so unwelcome. 
Still, the foregrounding of pleasure itself cannot be what Adorno criticises – after all, he 
himself argues that the postponement of pleasure for greater satisfaction latter rarely lives up 
to its promise, whether at the individual or social level, and that we should resist this 
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postponement strategy.
124
 Rather, his point seems to be that the satisfaction in question is 
merely an Ersatzbefriedigung, a vicarious satisfaction.
125
 Also, what he criticises is that the 
pursuit of instant gratification is replacing the one of critical reflection – making it more 
likely that the protest movements are co-opted into the mainstream. Instead of a real analysis 
of the concrete situation and its possibilities, actionism is blindly pursuing narcissistic gains 
at the expense of the pain-staking and demanding reflective work that is necessary. This is 
partly revealed in the activists’ refusal of critical introspection.
126
 Moreover, Adorno 
highlights the danger that actionism develops a dynamic of its own, whereby actions are 
undertaken merely to maintain the momentum of the movement (often by way of publicity 
stunts), independently of the wisdom or necessity of undertaking the acts in question.
127
 
Thirdly, Adorno objects to what he perceives as a refusal and also inability to make 
genuine and unrestricted experiences.
128
 As seen already (thesis 4), Adorno emphasises that it 
is exactly in this area where those that were lucky enough not yet to be co-opted should act – 
by criticising the conceptualisations that distort and narrow our experiences, and by educating 
people to develop their experiential capacities. Adorno thinks these crucial efforts are 
undermined by people’s jumping headfirst into political activities and cutting short debate 
with reference to practical urgency. Generally, he criticises the lack of analysis and the fact 
that, in the absence of theory, praxis becomes delusional.
129
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Fourthly, he objects to the various coercive, authoritarian aspects of actionism. For a 
start, he is concerned how debates are reduced to instrumental considerations about tactics.
130
 
Actual open discussion of the genuine issues is repressed. Instead, appeals to solidarity are 
used to shame and coerce people into action, even when they do not agree with what is being 
done or with the reasons for doing it.
131
 This can go as far as requiring people to sacrifice 
themselves for the movement – something Adorno finds reminiscent of fascist political 
repertoires.
132
 Generally, he accuses the actionists of exhibiting fascist character traits, such 
as drawing a sharp and exhaustive distinction between the in-group and others (between 
friends and enemies); or viewing critical attitudes as destructive; being indifferent to the 
content and shape of that against which one revolts or the complexities and the unintended 
consequences of doing so; cherishing decisionism and voluntarism; identifying with the 
collective at the expense of individual; being full of anger and indignation in a way that 
involves the readiness to inflict one’s rage on others.
133
 One might argue that this accusation 
overshoots the target – Marcuse certainly thought it did.
134
 Specifically, Marcuse defends the 
actionism of the students as a legitimate reaction of those who cannot bear any longer the 
suffocating and demeaning state of the world.
135
 Interestingly, Adorno rejects this, and 
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elsewhere explains why: while situation-based reaction to injustice and suffering has 
legitimacy in certain contexts – indeed, in such contexts, such reactions have more legitimacy 
than reasoning
136
 – this is true only of the most extreme circumstances, when faced with the 
“uttermost horror,”
137
 by which he presumably means fascism and other totalitarian 
domination. Within liberal democracies, such immediate reactions do not have the legitimacy 
that trumps the need for critical reflection. Moreover, if Adorno is right that the objective 
conditions breed certain authoritarian and fascist tendencies and character traits, then 
foregoing critical reflection and introspection is to forego perhaps the only counterstrategies 
at our disposal. By ignoring the dangers within, we sabotage the resistance to the dangers 
without. To face up to this, to assign critical reflection priority, is not a sign of resignation, 
but the only way to keep the flame of resistance alive.  
There is also a further coercive element that is internalised by the actionism of the 
student movement: the compulsion to positivity.
138
 Rather than objecting to the social trend 
of demanding always a positive, constructive element, even as part of radical criticism, 
actionism aligns itself with this trend. In contrast, Adorno is an avowed negativist:
139
 we can 
only know the bad (or parts thereof), not the good or what a free social arrangement would be; 
and the bad has normative force by itself to demand its own abolition. The reason for 
epistemic negativism is that our consciousness is determined by the current, radically evil 
social world, so that we cannot even imagine what a reconciled society and the human good 
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emerging in it would be like.
140
 In line with the Hegelian-Marxist critique of abstract 
utopianism, theory cannot anticipate what utopia would (concretely) consist in.
141
 What is 
bad and that we should avoid it, on the other hand, we can recognise and identify – history 
has taught us this painful lesson over and over again. Radical critique cannot be constructive 
or positive – for all positive or constructive suggestions will remain within the confines of the 
status quo, not point beyond it. Instead, radical critique should orientate itself on the basis of 
great evils; it should oppose barbarism
142
 and the recurrence of Auschwitz.
143
 To accuse 
critical thinkers of resignation, when they do not offer positive goals, is to blame the 
messenger, to act “[…] as though the obstruction were [their] fault, not the signature of the 
thing itself.”
144
 
Despite his criticisms, Adorno also praises the student movement. He acknowledges 
that it helped in reforming and democratising universities as well as in highlighting 
stultification processes and open repression, such as the murder of Benno Ohnesorg.
145
 He 
would have also welcomed some of the longer term changes it contributed to achieve in 
Germany (after his death), such as a more permissive sexual morality, or greater equality 
between the sexes.  
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Moreover, Adorno also acknowledges that the student movement was born in 
response to objective social tendencies,
146
 such as the integration of formerly progressive 
organisations (for instance, unions or social-democratic parties) into the capitalist 
mainstream.
147
 (Notably, the German social-democratic party (SPD) had entered into a 
“grand coalition” with the conservatives in 1966, leaving hardly any opposition in parliament 
and none that was on the political left.) Indeed, Adorno blames some of failures of the student 
movement on objective social tendencies: for example, its personalisation (including 
personality cult of leaders) is a response to “[…] the fact that within the anynomous 
apparatus the individual does not count anymore […];”
148
 its tendency to formal process and 
institutionalisation, even in protesting against institutions, exhibits how society has formed 
them to the core; as does its fetishising of means and technical gadgets.
149
 In fact, primacy of 
practice is the implicit credo of late modernity and just repeats the blind supremacy of 
material praxis (that is, praxis as productive labour) originally in the pursuit of survival for 
the species, but now surplus-value augmentation.
150
 Rather than an expression of freedom, its 
origin as a reflex to deprivation marks praxis even now as a form of unfreedom.
151
 Indeed, 
prioritising praxis is “[…] the programme of absolute domination of nature […],”
152
 an arch-
bourgeois project that deserves to be criticised, not accepted, as (Adorno thought) even Marx 
wrongly did. 
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Instead of subscribing to the primacy of praxis, Adorno would agree with Habermas 
that the student movement should concentrate mainly on democratising universities, on 
preventing the “interlocking of instruction and research with power and prestige” (i.e. on 
maintaining the autonomy of research and teaching), and on securing a critical education for 
an increasing share of the population.
153
 
  
11 
 Participation in political activity requires justification to each individual. 
More implicit than explicit, Adorno’s theory and practical engagement contain a criterion for 
participation in political activity. In effect, he demands that political activity has to be such 
that the justification and nature of the proposed activity is transparent to those who are asked 
to participate in it.
154
 As examples of activities where this criterion was met in his eyes, he 
highlights both his participation in protests against the introduction of state of emergency 
legislation and his attempts to reform the penal code, specifically by removing those elements 
that are based on a restrictive sexual morality. Indeed, once this criterion was met, Adorno 
would throw his weight behind the measure in question – as a former assistant and then co-
director of the Institute of Social Research, Ludwig von Friedeburg, attests: “One could 
completely rely on him [Adorno], once he had appreciated the justification for a cause: he 
would stand firm and support you through thick and thin.”
155
  
 One might argue that the criterion in question is too demanding – indeed, that it is 
practically crippling. While radical political organisations should be as democratic as possible, 
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this should not come at the expense of political effectiveness. Lenin’s idea of “democratic 
centralism” is often presented as squaring that particular circle. However, Adorno would have 
been suspicious of this proposal. For, while it might secure freedom of discussion, it also 
entails that the minority can be outvoted and is strictly bound to act on the majority’s decision. 
Indeed, as Leninism is often understood and as it was practiced, the decisions of the higher 
bodies of a party organisation are binding on lower bodies and party members, whatever the 
latter’s view of the matter. At least Adorno’s settled view is incompatible with this, requiring 
as it does that those participating have to receive a justification that is acceptable to each, not 
just to the majority or the higher bodies within an organisation.
156
 Indeed, in a clear dig 
against Brecht, Adorno notes already in 1953, “[t]he sentence that a thousand eyes see more 
than two is a lie and the exact expression of the fetishism of collectivity and organisation, 
which to pierce is the highest obligation of social insight today.”
157
  
 It should be clear that the proposed criterion presents a norm, but that this norm is 
neither derived from an ideal-theoretical account of political activity in a just society, nor 
based on the ideal speech situation, nor in any other way departing from Adorno’s negativism. 
Rather, it is a norm that arises from the historical experience of misfiring emancipatory 
politics and “a concrete analysis of the concrete situation” (and thus, according to Lenin, “[…] 
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the very gist, the living soul, of Marxism […]”).
158
 This norm might not apply in a 
revolutionary situation or in the emergency of resisting fascist regimes, but has its time and 
place in the actual historical circumstances of West Germany’s 1960s.  
 
Summing up the discussion in a slogan is probably unwise and Adorno would have 
not approved of it, but let me take up the provocative stance that he sometimes assumes, and 
conclude that Adorno’s view comes down to saying that people have tried to change the 
world, in various ways; the point in the 1960s was to interpret it.
159
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